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The Multiple Selves of Economic Self-Determination 
Odette Lienau 
abstract.  In this Essay, I argue that the contemporary world requires an explicitly plural and 
flexible conception of economic self-determination and especially a broader vision of the economic 
“self” at its center. I contend that older dyadic understandings of economic self-determination, 
formed largely in light of twentieth-century anticolonial struggles, are no longer sufficient. Indi-
viduals can be economically constrained across multiple vectors by newly powerful actors and in-
novative forms of control. They are thus potentially implicated in multiple political and economic 
selves—not just personal but also local, national, and transnational. 
 As such, those seeking to promote economic self-determination should more explicitly recog-
nize and perhaps strategically enable and enhance this flexibility. At the same time, anyone work-
ing for change must remain aware of how each “self” can still be coopted and reshaped by those 
who would deliberately or inadvertently limit the economic potential of others in pursuit of their 
own benefit. We must avoid, for example, both an atomistic and counterproductive individualism 
and an uninterrogated support for elites shielded by the concept of the nation-state. At a deeper 
process level, we should also help build capacities and mechanisms that make the sources of eco-
nomic unfreedom more visible and understandable and that enable the kinds of flexible economic 
self-definition and cross-cutting alliances that the contemporary moment requires. 
introduction: who are we determining against? 
It is telling and unsurprising that the recent backlash against globalization 
has coincided with a rise in populist authoritarianism. Both phenomena are 
grounded, in different ways and perhaps for different ends, in the apparent re-
jection of a one-size-fits-all political and economic model in the international 
realm. Indeed, the post-Cold War narrative suggesting that the globe would 
eventually be covered by free-trading, liberal-democracy-loving states now 
seems naïve. Rejecting this narrative, both phenomena also lay claim to dis-
courses aligned with the broad concept of self-determination, including eco-
nomic self-determination, and point to the modern complications and entangle-
ments in this warren of ideas. 
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In this Essay, I argue that older dyadic conceptions of economic self-deter-
mination, built largely in light of twentieth-century anticolonial struggles, are 
no longer sufficient. I contend that the contemporary world instead requires an 
explicitly plural and flexible conception of economic self-determination and es-
pecially a broader conception of the economic “self” at its center. I focus here on 
economic self-determination in particular for two reasons. First, the call for eco-
nomic self-determination seems to be recurrent and near universal. Even in pol-
ities with relatively stable and successful mechanisms for political self-determi-
nation, the vicissitudes of commodity and currency markets, trading partners, 
and numerous other factors mean that a sense of economic crisis, oppression, or 
helplessness returns over and again.1 Second, many calls for political self-deter-
mination seem to follow from prior discontent with a lack of economic power 
and control, which then spills over into more traditionally “political” forms and 
demands. As such, although these arenas are conceptually and practically deeply 
intertwined, I suggest that attending more closely to the economic dimension 
might deepen our understanding of these dynamics writ large. 
I also should clarify that, in focusing on economic self-determination, I only 
look at one of (at least) two major facets of economic well-being. By economic 
self-determination I mean, very broadly, the capacity and space to determine the 
conditions of labor, production, acquisition, and distribution. This might apply 
to individuals who hope to determine both the type and conditions of their work 
and also how any resulting gains are distributed. Or it might apply to collectivi-
ties, such as nation-states, whose decisionmakers hope to set independent eco-
nomic policies on how to produce goods, secure other necessary and desirable 
acquisitions, and redistribute material wealth. Central to understandings of self-
determination along these lines is the idea of an absence of domination or sub-
ordination in decisionmaking; it is somewhat more focused on process than out-
come.2 Economic self-determination is, therefore, not necessarily synonymous 
with sustenance. Certainly, lacking the basics required for living would hinder 
efforts at economic self-determination, and such deprivation or extreme auster-
ity is oppression worth fighting against. Still, one could be economically well 
cared for, and even live in the lap of luxury, while also lacking the capacity and 
 
1. For a much-discussed book on the recurring nature of financial crises in particular, see CAR-
MEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FI-
NANCIAL FOLLY (2011). 
2. Without going too deeply into schools and discussions within political theory, this is akin to 
ideas of freedom as nondomination in the work of scholars such as Philip Pettit. See, e.g., 
PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT (1999). For an in-
terpretation of how this conception of freedom underlined certain facets of the American con-
stitutional experience, see, for example, AZIZ RANA, THE TWO FACES OF AMERICAN FREEDOM 
52-54 (2010). 
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space to make meaningful economic choices.3 As such, while the relationship be-
tween self-determination and sustenance should be acknowledged, these forms 
of economic well-being should not be confused. 
In focusing on economic self-determination and arguing that we now need 
an explicitly plural and flexible conception of the “self” at its center, I highlight 
a series of questions that seem especially pressing for the contemporary moment 
in global law, policy-making, and even on-the-ground activism. To begin with, 
what is the nature of today’s fights to maximize economic capacity, agency, and 
independence? Or, in other words, is it clear who or what we should be econom-
ically determining against? Relatedly, what are the possible “selves” at the center 
of economic self-determination today, particularly given the shifting landscape 
of political affiliations and economic power centers? Is it a state entity facing the 
edifice of transnational rules and institutions that constrain its economic policy 
options? The people living within a country who are collectively struggling un-
der the corruption and self-dealing of an economic elite? An individual con-
strained by a set of economic deprivations or limitations over which they have 
little control? Or a transnational group, such as a socioeconomic class, facing a 
constellation of norms, market forces, and technological developments that ren-
der it marginalized and disempowered? What does the selection of one “self” as 
opposed to another mean at this historical juncture, and might it make more 
sense to think of individuals as potentially embedded in multiple economic 
selves simultaneously? 
There are no easy answers. Any effort to address such questions, particularly 
in such a short space, necessarily involves significant oversimplification. But I 
argue that workable understandings of self-determination—those capable of at-
tracting adherents and enabling change—depend in part on a conception of 
whom the self is determining against.4 In other words, the struggle against eco-
nomic domination or unfreedom itself helps to define the historically and polit-
ically relevant economic “self,” and there is no clear or coherent self in the absence 
of such a project.5 This means that any effort to conceive of economic self-
 
3. A classic example is a person—more commonly a woman—whose material needs and wants 
are met but who has no control over her own labor or property. In the United States, histori-
cally such a status was enabled by the common law of coverture, by which a married woman’s 
labor and property were controlled by her husband. For a foundational discussion of the af-
terlife of coverture, see Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating 
Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127 (1995). 
4. Although I focus on economic self-determination here, I consider this dynamic relevant across 
all forms of self-determination. 
5. This, of course, connects to longstanding approaches in social and political theory that posit 
the construction of identity, including the political, social, or cultural identity of a group, 
against a real or imagined “other.” For variations on this theme, see, for example, SIMONE DE 
BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley ed. & trans., Alfred A. Knopf 1952) (1949); 
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determination today requires a clearer view of the target of self-determination 
efforts. And, of course, it requires a comprehension of the fact that there may be 
many targets, of many sorts, requiring a potential multiplicity of selves—possi-
bly all in play at the same time, even for a single individual—to effectively coun-
ter the economic unfreedom still felt by so many. 
I start this Essay by highlighting the mostly dyadic anticolonial context in 
which early global discussions of self-determination, including economic self-
determination, took place—a background that has been crystallized in interna-
tional legal documents and continues to frame our practices and controversies 
today. I then note the degree to which the context has shifted significantly in 
recent decades and suggest that we should therefore expand our conception of 
economic self-determination, and particularly its struggles and key protagonists. 
In other words, we should reconsider who the “self” might be and whether the 
answer is necessarily unitary. Finally, I briefly lay out some of the implications of 
this expanded view, pointing out how individuals can be economically con-
strained across numerous vectors and are thus potentially implicated in multiple 
political and economic selves—not just personal but also local, national, and 
transnational. As such, those seeking to shape global law and policy should more 
explicitly recognize and perhaps strategically enable and enhance this flexibility, 
while remaining aware of how each “self” can still be coopted and reshaped by 
those who would deliberately or inadvertently constrain the economic potential 
of others in pursuit of their own benefit. 
i .  the dyadic context of early economic self-
determination 
To begin with, how has the contemporary landscape for thinking about eco-
nomic self-determination changed? The earliest discussions of self-determina-
tion at the international level imagined a fairly dyadic relationship. Early propo-
nents conceived of self-determination as a way to address and alter the link 
between an external power and the people living within a given territory.6 Often, 
the dyadic relationship was very obvious, with a clear colonial state and a colo-
nized population. Although the ideal-type understanding of colonial domination 
involves a direct military occupation of a foreign geographic area, the term and 
 
ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, INTRODUCTION TO THE READING OF HEGEL: LECTURES ON THE PHENOM-
ENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (Allan Bloom ed., James H. Nichols, Jr. trans., Basic Books 1969) (1947); 
and CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE MODERN IDENTITY (1989). 
6. Of course, these early proponents often were unsuccessful. For a consideration of this early 
context, see, for example, EREZ MANELA, THE WILSONIAN MOMENT: SELF-DETERMINATION 
AND THE INTERNATIONAL ORIGINS OF ANTICOLONIAL NATIONALISM (2007). 
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the practice itself is of course flexible.7 Colonial control has occurred, and can 
occur, not only through military but also political, economic, social, and cultural 
means. And economic control and the extraction of economic wealth was with-
out a doubt a primary driver for, and instrument in, colonial projects as a whole.8 
As a result of this relatively dyadic relationship, the colonial state itself 
emerged as a clear target of anger and pressure for those interested in ending 
relationships of economic oppression and control—for those interested in eco-
nomic self-determination.9 Even when economic interests and entities consti-
tuted the driving force behind such unfreedom, this domination eventually 
tended to take a political state-centered form, and as such the colonial state func-
tionally and symbolically became intertwined with such oppression.10 Thus, 
even though the forms of colonial rule varied considerably, spanning multiple 
permutations of direct and indirect rule and varying degrees of reliance on and 
collusion with economic interests, an external state actor remained a clear and 
valid target for reform and revolution. 
Given this relatively obvious source of oppressive control and the ways in 
which political and economic domination were so deeply intertwined, early in-
ternational calls for self-determination took as their primary target the colonial 
state and the colonial-imperial system.11 It is therefore unsurprising that the pri-
mary political-economic “self” that emerged, or self-defined, against this colo-
nial system was itself the abstract idea of a nation-state—a rough mirror image 
 
7. I use “ideal-type” in the sense formulated by sociologist Max Weber, who noted that, in stud-
ying and comparing social and historical phenomena, it is analytically helpful to have a shared 
conceptual construct or heuristic that draws from and captures elements of reality but does 
not necessarily mirror any given instance of reality. See MAX WEBER, “OBJECTIVITY” IN SOCIAL 
SCIENCE AND SOCIAL POLICY (1904), reprinted in THE METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 
90 (Edward A. Shils & Henry A. Finch eds. & trans., 1949). 
8. There are many histories of particular colonial projects, but for a very broad overview, see, for 
example, MARC FERRO, COLONIZATION: A GLOBAL HISTORY (1997). For a recent take on the 
timing and possible reasons for colonial ventures, see Arhan Ertan et al., Who Was Colonized 
and When? A Cross-Country Analysis of Determinants, 83 EUR. ECON. REV. 171-181 (2016). 
9. See generally, e.g., MANELA, supra note 6, at 12 (suggesting that “campaigns to advance de-
mands for self-determination and international equality and the subsequent failure and disil-
lusionment helped launch major anticolonial protest movements and mobilize widespread 
popular support behind them” and that “political and economic factors” significantly contrib-
uted to these movements). 
10. The British and Dutch East India Companies perhaps provide the classic examples here. The 
companies themselves exerted certain forms of political-military rule and, in both cases, their 
activities provided the foundation for, and were ultimately absorbed into, their home states’ 
explicit colonial projects. There is a massive literature on these companies, but for a recent 
sampling see, for example, THE DUTCH AND ENGLISH EAST INDIA COMPANIES: DIPLOMACY, 
TRADE, AND VIOLENCE IN EARLY MODERN ASIA (Adam Clulow & Tristan Mostert eds., 2018). 
11. See generally, e.g., MANELA, supra note 6. 
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of the colonial states—now presented by those seeking to cast off this major op-
pressive force as the proper locus for all decisionmaking. Of course, we can im-
agine other selves that might have emerged as dominant against the colonial sys-
tem. The key “self” could have been defined against the idea of nation-states 
altogether, for example in favor of a transnational class-based conception of the 
relevant agent fighting unfreedom, urged most famously by Vladimir Lenin.12 
But, particularly in a world in which states were already powerful and broadly 
legitimate actors—and in which class-based revolution was difficult, to say the 
least—the most comprehensible and effective “self” in the international system 
resided (or was taken to reside) in the state form. 
The foundational international legal documents and norms that speak to 
self-determination bear the marks of this historical context. In particular, they 
enshrine latent nation-states—called “peoples”—as the key entities in determin-
ing political and economic processes and outcomes in the territories that they 
cover and, collectively, in the world at large.13 The initial post-World War I vi-
sion imagined in the Treaty of Versailles and associated documents only ex-
tended to European peoples under foreign domination, in line with the concerns 
and geostrategic interests of that war’s victors.14 But the idea resonated with the 
goals of anticolonial movements throughout the world, and calls for independ-
ent sovereignty and self-determination for a plurality of inchoate nation-states 
became especially central to geopolitics and to international law in the decades 
immediately following World War II.15 
In line with this conceptual movement, Article 1 of the 1945 United Nations 
Charter refers to the principles of “equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples,”16 and other key international legal documents of the post-war order echo 
this language. In particular, the shared Article 1(1) of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (jointly adopted by the U.N. General Assembly on 
 
12. VLADIMIR LENIN, IMPERIALISM: THE HIGHEST STAGE OF CAPITALISM (1917). 
13. See in particular Article 1 of the 1945 U.N. Charter and shared Article 1(1) of the of the Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M 368, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
[hereinafter ICCPR], and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 6 I.L.M. 360, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter ICESCR], as I discuss shortly. 
14. Indeed, in 1919 President Wilson himself admitted, “When I gave utterance to those words 
‘concerning self-determination’ I said them without the knowledge that nationalities existed, 
which are coming to us day after day . . . . You do not know and cannot appreciate the anxieties 
that I have experienced as a result of many millions of people having their hopes raised by 
what I have said.” ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 22 (1995). 
15. The independence struggles of various states are captured in myriad books and scholarly ar-
ticles, but for a recent and very brief overview of these trends as a whole, see JAN C. JANSEN & 
JÜRGEN OSTERHAMMEL, DECOLONIZATION: A SHORT HISTORY (Jeremiah Riemer trans., 2017). 
16. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
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December 16, 1966) emphasizes that “[a]ll peoples have the right of self-deter-
mination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and 
freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development.”17 
Although this emerging conception of the self ultimately took on the nation-
state template—simultaneously countering and mirroring colonial powers—the 
question of how to name an inchoate entity not yet actually politically con-
structed or internationally legally recognized is hardly straightforward. “Peo-
ples”—the term ultimately settled upon for a nascent polity—is far from clear 
and has been subject to different interpretations and heavy contestation.18 One 
key question that arose from this geopolitical and textual landscape—a question 
that bedevils us still—is whether the self-determination of peoples is purely “ex-
ternal” or whether it deals with “internal” self-determination as well.19 External 
self-determination is understood to deal primarily with foreign relations and the 
right to be free of external political control—the paradigmatic form of which 
was, of course, colonial control. Internal self-determination, by contrast, ad-
dresses the ways in which the people of a territory should have control over its 
political, economic, and social structures and policies, including the degree to 
which a governmental form should be democratic, constitutionalist, authoritar-
ian or any other variation. It may also deal with the degree to which minority 
groups within a polity should be accorded some degree of autonomy. The “ex-
ternal” interpretation seems to have attracted more adherents, at least in terms 
of the number of states, particularly among postcolonial countries wary of any 
legal imprimatur for meddling in their internal workings. They point to the U.N. 
Charter’s related principles of “sovereign equality” and nonintervention in inter-
nal affairs, which have been taken to hold regardless of internal differences, in-
cluding, presumably, differences in the degree of personal or collective freedom 
 
17. ICCPR, supra note 13, art. 1(1); ICESCR, supra note 13, art. 1(1). 
18. For various scholarly takes related to this topic, see, among many others, CASSESSE, supra note 
14; Patrick Thornberry, The Democratic or Internal Aspect of Self-Determination with Some Re-
marks on Federalism, in 16 DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, MODERN LAW OF SELF-DE-
TERMINATION (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1992); and Kalana Senaratne, Internal Self-Determi-
nation in International Law: A Critical Third-World Perspective, 3 ASIAN J. INT’L L. 305 (2015). 
Courts have also worked to interpret this difficult language. See, e.g., Supreme Court of Canada, 
Reference re: Secession of Quebec (File No. 25506, Aug. 20, 1998, [1998] S.C.R. 217); Case Con-
cerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30); Case Concerning the Frontier Dis-
pute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554 (Dec. 22);. 
19. This is, of course, only one of the many complications and disagreements surrounding the 
concept. As James Summers points out, “[e]ngaging with the extensive literature on self-de-
termination can be a monumental task.” James Summers, Self-Determination in International 
Law, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (June 27, 2017), https://www.oxfordbibliographies.com 
/view/document/obo-9780199796953/obo-9780199796953-0033.xml [https://perma.cc 
/NM4X-L6TT]. For a classic take on the internal/external dimension and a defense of the 
internal position, see CASSESSE, supra note 14. 
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granted to the individuals or minority groups living in those states.20 But the 
“internal” legal interpretation has had broad appeal, particularly with the rise of 
human-rights law and associated doctrines and the related willingness to recog-
nize and call out abuses in other states’ domestic spheres.21 
Still, my goal in this Essay is not to wade into the very deep waters of proper 
international legal interpretation. Rather, I aim to highlight that there is already 
a discussion of which “self” stands at the center of self-determination, be it po-
litical or economic, and that there is already a certain dissatisfaction with overly 
narrow interpretations. Indeed, scholars have pointed out that the legal forms 
and languages adopted for the post-World War II era closed off possibilities. For 
example, Sundhya Pahuja has pointed out that, while “international law did pro-
vide a language in which claims for decolonization could gain a certain audibility, 
. . . it locked in nation statehood as the only way to claim legal personality. The 
price of audibility was thus the nation state form.”22 And in calling for a “New 
International Economic Order,” which never came to fruition, Mohammed Be-
djaoui highlighted that the existing form of self-determination ultimately 
proved insufficient to actually ensure freedom: “Traditional international law 
has helped to make independence a completely superficial phenomenon, beneath 
the surface of which the old forms of domination survive and the economic em-
pires of the multinational corporations, and the powers that protect them, pros-
per.”23 In short, although traditional nation-state-based forms of economic self-
determination arguably delivered a degree of independence, they failed to seri-
ously address economic domination. 
i i .  rethinking the contemporary “self” for economic self-
determination 
The debate over the proper legal meaning of self-determination, and the dis-
satisfaction with how the formal self-determination of nation-states has none-
theless proven entirely compatible with economic subordination, highlight sev-
eral points worth emphasizing. First, the entities to which the concept of self-
determination might plausibly attach internationally—peoples, states, 
 
20. U.N. Charter art. 2. 
21. Scholars have gone so far as to argue that the “principle of non-interference” is not relevant if 
intervention is in support of the key principle of self-determination, with self-determination 
here taking a more internal flavor. See, e.g., CASSESSE, supra note 14, at 176. 
22. SUNDHYA PAHUJA, DECOLONISING INTERNATIONAL LAW: DEVELOPMENT, ECONOMIC GROWTH 
AND THE POLITICS OF UNIVERSALITY 45 (2011). Pahuja further argues that this effectively meant 
buying into a “universal historical narrative” associated with the nation-state form and its 
vision of development. Id. For Pahuja’s discussion of this bargain, see id. at 54-59. 
23. MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 81 (1979). 
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territories, even social classes—are not natural beings. There is no unambiguous 
and single “self” in these discussions, and individuals are all plausibly part of 
multiple “selves,” perhaps even simultaneously. Relatedly, in thinking strategi-
cally about these issues, the selection or emphasis of one or another potential self 
may be more or less appropriate at different times and places, depending on the 
key source of economic oppression. During the colonial era, it may well have 
made sense to emphasize a nascent nation-state as the most likely entity to suc-
cessfully struggle against colonial forms of oppression. But discussions of self-
determination that fail to grasp its historically contingent effectiveness can feel 
outdated in an economic world constructed by newly powerful actors and inno-
vative forms of control.24 
How do these insights map onto the contemporary landscape of global eco-
nomic power relations? What are the current sources of economic oppression 
against which we might define an economically determining “self”? If the earli-
est discussions of self-determination imagined a fairly dyadic or bipolar colonial 
relationship, almost the opposite holds true today. The still-emerging new world 
order is a complex one in which individuals, localities, states, and other associa-
tions are enmeshed in a web of multiple public and private entities that may be 
key trading partners, investors, aid donors, or partners in other endeavors. And 
these actors, each of which can be understood as a center of power and thus po-
tentially of oppression, are of different sorts and sizes. For example, although the 
dominant actors in international relations and political science are historically 
taken to be nation-states with large spheres of influence, the power of multina-
tional corporations and often-autonomous international economic organizations 
can dwarf that of many nation-states.25 Nor is it clear that there is a center or a 
periphery that falls neatly along an imagined geography of a global North and 
South (or of the West and the Rest), particularly with the rise of “South-South” 
economic relations.26 In addition, discussions of and attempted coalitions across 
transnational class lines have become more widespread, even at the heart of the 
old “Center.” These trends have been well documented elsewhere but the 
 
24. I do not want to overstate the shift from an earlier era. Colonial entities like the British or 
Dutch East India Companies were multinational, politico-economic, and embedded in net-
works of local elites as well. But I nonetheless contend that the multipronged transnational 
scale and the rapidity and fluidity of changes in today’s world is hard to match. 
25. This is much commented on, but for a recent popular take, see generally Parag Khanna & 
David Francis, Rise of the Titans, FOREIGN POL’Y (2016), https://foreignpolicy.com 
/2016/03/15/these-25-companies-are-more-powerful-than-many-countries-multinational 
-corporate-wealth-power [https://perma.cc/BUP6-F9QG]. 
26. The World Bank identified this trend in its 2006 Global Development Finance report, and the 
trend has only intensified since then. 1 WORLD BANK GRP., REPORT NO. 36280, GLOBAL DE-
VELOPMENT FINANCE: THE DEVELOPMENT POTENTIAL OF SURGING CAPITAL FLOWS 107-38 
(2006). 
the multiple selves of economic self-determination 
683 
outcome bears repeating: when it comes to the realization of particular political 
and economic projects, neither the nation-state nor the classic global dividing 
lines seem as conceptually relevant as they once were, even if they remain central 
to international legal texts and many global practices. This is hardly to suggest 
that we are moving toward a form of cosmopolitanism in which all people are 
part of the same globe-spanning community. Indeed, it would perhaps be more 
accurate to say that the possible divisions have multiplied and become more 
cross-cutting. Whereas in the anticolonial moment someone committed to eco-
nomic self-determination might have challenged the relevant colonial power, to-
day challenges would have to be issued to many more entities. 
The increasingly complicated political geographies of economic constraint 
are made even more complex by the different institutional sources and legal 
forms of those constraints, not to mention the substantive issue areas in which 
economic actors of all types are embedded. The panoply of international eco-
nomic organizations and practices—the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
World Bank, World Trade Organization, and practices of investment and com-
mercial arbitration (notably but hardly exclusively)—shapes and constrains the 
economic policy choices and capacities of states, intra-state actors, and even in-
dividuals in ways that can be oppressive.27 Although engagement with these or-
ganizations and practices is technically voluntary (at least for states, not so much 
for individuals within them), it has become increasingly difficult to opt out of 
the system as a whole.28 In addition to formal organizations, private-entity and 
sovereign-state transactions and agreements in the substantive issue areas of 
trade, intellectual property, foreign investment, financing and sovereign debt, 
international tax, and the like can expand or limit economic choices.29 And across 
each of these areas, there can be multiple types of constraints and rules, including 
not only hard and soft law but also non-state practices, norms, and market prin-
ciples that may act in ways that curtail autonomy.30 
 
27. The relationship of these types of institutions to states is much commented upon, but for one 
excellent take, see NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK, AND 
THEIR BORROWERS (2006). 
28. See, e.g., id. 
29. For an overview of the myriad transactions and public and private agreements that can con-
strain and expand a state’s economic capacity, one could look at any number of treatises or 
casebooks dealing with transnational economic law. See, e.g., JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL 
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS (6th 
ed., 2013); ANDREAS LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW (2d ed., 2008); DETLEV F. 
VAGTS ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL BUSINESS PROBLEMS (6th ed., 2019). 
30. For a discussion of how these rule forms interact to constrain choice, see Odette Lienau, Law 
in Hiding: Market Principles in the Global Legal Order, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 541-608 (2017). 
the yale law journal forum February 24, 2020 
684 
But even categorizing the different sources of domination provides an insuf-
ficient understanding, as a static typology fails to capture the dynamism that ex-
ists across those sources. Today’s mechanisms for potential domination seem to 
be distinctly fluid, perhaps uniquely in human history, taking different legal 
forms across multiple jurisdictional levels. A nationally based business can be-
come a multinational corporation, establishing subsidiaries in multiple jurisdic-
tions that then compete with each other. A subsidiary may enter into a joint ven-
ture with a state-owned entity, with the joint venture then becoming powerful 
enough and embedded enough with a state’s elites to shift national policy in its 
favor. Maybe the joint venture, along with other companies in what has become 
a key national industry, borrows significantly from local and international banks 
to fund operational expansions. And perhaps, in order to help these key compa-
nies access international markets and secure further foreign investment, the state 
enters into a series of trade and investment treaties that eventually push a portion 
of the population in less competitive sectors into unemployment. But then im-
agine that this key industry, due to climate-change-induced weather disasters 
and the unexpected emergence of overseas competitors, suffers a simultaneous 
destruction of half of its export capacity and a drop in the global market price of 
the surviving exportable products. The industry’s subsequent defaults on its 
debts threaten the over-invested local banking sector, prompting the sovereign 
government to take over those private-sector loans beyond its budgetary capac-
ity. The resulting sovereign debt crisis then leads to an IMF package involving 
overzealous austerity measures, undermining the economic prospects of the na-
tion-state and of individual people—the most educated and entrepreneurial of 
whom have already emigrated.31 And, perhaps, through each of these decisions 
and crises, corrupt elites—aided by international banking practices—make 
choices guided more by their interest in securing and stowing away side-pay-
ments than by the needs of the underlying population. One could go on with 
variations on these themes.32 
 
31. The IMF has gone through various phases in the strictness of the austerity measures it re-
quires in order to extend financial assistance. Perhaps one of the most striking admissions of 
uncertainty came in the first days of 2013, when IMF chief economist Olivier Blanchard 
copublished a working paper—interpreted by many as a mea culpa—suggesting that the or-
ganization’s models had misjudged and underestimated the negative effect of austerity 
measures on growth in European countries during a debt crisis. See Olivier Blanchard & Dan-
iel Leigh, Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal Multipliers (IMF, Working Paper No. 13/1, 2013); 
Howard Schneider, An Amazing Mea Culpa from the IMF’s Chief Economist on Austerity, WASH. 
POST (Jan. 3, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2013/01/03/an 
-amazing-mea-culpa-from-the-imfs-chief-economist-on-austerity [https://perma.cc/55VY-
YHBP]. 
32. This sad tale is a composite or amalgam, but those familiar with the history of financial crises 
will recognize elements from many real-world cases. 
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So, the hard question is: what, or who, is responsible for the economic dom-
ination in this tangle? There are multiple potential starting points for these over-
lapping and shifting circles of constraint. Is it the IMF? Corrupt elites and the 
banking structures that enable them? Foreign investment? Is it climate change, 
under-addressed at the national and international levels, resulting in destructive 
weather patterns? The deregulation of local and international banks? Free trade 
or globalization more generally? Capitalism as a whole? Fields such as political 
science or economics can develop hypotheses and test which of these vectors is 
likely to emerge and constrain the action of others at a particular time and place. 
But, as a general matter, it is very difficult to establish once and for all what might 
be the primary oppressive power center. And it is also entirely possible that—
even if efforts were made and were initially successful in pinpointing the power 
center—the primary source of the problem would shift.33 For those interested in 
economic self-determination, this means that it is far from clear what counts as 
the dominant mode of constraint and thus which “self” we should be seeking to 
defend in this historical moment. 
But perhaps we are thinking at an overly broad and abstract level here, and 
we should focus instead on narrower problems, such as corruption, bank dereg-
ulation, more rationalized sovereign-debt restructuring, fine-tuning trade agree-
ments, or strengthening the emergency powers in investment treaties, among 
endless others. Such projects are certainly essential, and probably deserve most 
of our focus. But part of the difficulty is precisely that the problems are so deeply 
interconnected. And an even more important part of the difficulty lies precisely 
with the fact that the solution to one problem—perhaps reasserting the emer-
gency regulatory power of state elites vis-à-vis international investors—could 
exacerbate another problem, for example the tendency of elites to put in place 
arbitrary regulations that worsen the country’s economic prospects but allow 
them to accept side money by selectively enforcing the regulations. Protecting 
the sovereignty and enhancing the economic self-determination of the nation-
state—without further interrogation of how the nation-state form, controlled by 
elites, may itself be economically constraining—fails to grasp the extent of the 
problem. 
Maybe we should alternatively say that, first and foremost, the individual 
human is and should be at the center of any discussion of economic self-deter-
mination. In one way, this makes intuitive sense, as the human is the one living, 
breathing entity who truly “feels” economic oppression and constraint. This is 
in line with classical liberal conceptions of economic freedom and arguably with 
 
33. Perhaps the true culprit is simply human avarice, but that is so obviously true and also such a 
universal as to be virtually meaningless. (And, with a tip of the hat to Adam Smith, it is not 
always easy to find or draw the line between potentially virtuous self-interest and the vice of 
avarice.) 
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certain moves in human-rights law and in the emergence of the “Responsibility 
to Protect” doctrine and movement.34 But putting the individual too unthink-
ingly at the center of economic self-determination risks slipping into a kind of 
political atomism and missing the impact of the many and very real power im-
balances at the collective level. If individuals are granted legal and/or strategic 
primacy, and are then faced with significantly stronger collective entities such as 
multinational corporations or international financial institutions, they are virtu-
ally certain to fail in any effort to claim power absent the intermediate and po-
tentially stronger entity of the state. This can also inadvertently invite interven-
tion by (ostensibly) well-meaning others who purport to have all the answers 
for maximizing individual freedom—flat taxes, knee-jerk deregulation, indis-
criminately securing private property against public action, even treating foreign 
settings as opportunities for economic experimentation along these lines—and 
risk reproducing certain colonial hierarchies.35 Such an approach could, perhaps 
unintentionally, ultimately limit the real economic capacities of individuals on 
the ground. 
In short, in given moments or places, different entities might emerge as the 
most appropriate “self” for economic self-determination. And the enhancement 
of economic self-determination through one entity or mechanism may have con-
straining effects through another. As such, to the extent that advocates propose 
any particular policy or legal change in order to promote economic well-being 
and choice more generally, they must at least be aware of this larger picture and 
the potentially hydraulic relationship between its parts. 
conclusion: embracing multiplicity 
While emphasizing the importance of asking about the proper “self” in eco-
nomic self-determination, I have very deliberately avoided presenting a single 
answer for who (or what) this “self” might be. I have also avoided narrowly 
 
34. Unanimously endorsed at the U.N. World Summit in 2005, the responsibility to protect (R2P) 
requires states to intervene (by force as a last measure, with Security Council approval) to 
protect against genocide or crimes of mass atrocity. The U.N. Security Council reaffirmed R2P 
in 2006, 2009, and 2014, and the U.N. Secretary-General has issued annual reports on R2P 
and its implementation since 2009. For an overview of R2P from various perspectives, see 
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (Alex J. Bellamy & Tim Dunne 
eds., 2016). 
35. Certain policies debated after the United States’s 2003 invasion of Iraq come to mind, perhaps 
most strikingly the idea of a flat tax for the new regime. The decision not to engage in a sig-
nificant program of economic redistribution and land reform in post-apartheid South Africa 
was similarly linked to language of economic freedom and private property and has signifi-
cantly shaped experiences of economic oppression for formally politically free black South 
Africans. 
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defining an entity or even a type of oppression or economic control that eco-
nomic self-determination might work against, although colonialism, extreme 
austerity, and prolonged unemployment or underemployment might be exam-
ples. This demurral relates to my contention that the “self” in this area is histor-
ically contingent and should be conceived of in response to concrete experiences 
of economic domination. And domination itself can be a subjectively and indi-
vidually felt phenomenon, even if it often filters through a collective entity and 
experience. It is possible that one individual or group finds oppressive a set of 
conditions relating to work or wealth distribution that others do not. As such, 
the constraints and oppressions deemed acceptable in one time or place may be 
recognized as deeply problematic in another.36 
If economic domination means many things and can work through multiple 
vectors, with the concomitant economic “self” being similarly multiple and tran-
sient, what are the next steps for those committed to economic self-determina-
tion, writ large? Of course, there are specific policy projects that can be pursued 
in given issue areas. But, in addition, part of the goal would presumably be to 
expand the ways that people, acting both individually and collectively through 
local, national, and transnational entities, might be able to make a decision as to 
which “self” is relevant at any given moment. In order to do this, they should 
ideally be able to answer: What are the sources of economic oppression that I 
face? Who else wrestles with the same oppression and from the same sources? 
How do I connect with them to form coalitions and act in solidarity to forestall 
further control (and, perhaps, to fashion economic processes or outcomes more 
in keeping with my own interests and values)? Being able to answer these ques-
tions is hardly a sufficient condition for economic self-determination—there re-
main problems of power imbalances and collective action, among many others. 
But, assuming that economic freedom requires a clear-eyed identification of 
sources of unfreedom and of potential allies in any social movement, it is likely 
a necessary condition. 
Concretely, this could implicate a series of specific policy projects that do not 
immediately appear to be linked to economic issues but that indirectly support 
economic self-determination as I have conceived of it. In particular, such projects 
might include enhancing the transparency (and quality) of available infor-
mation; working toward secure energy, food, and water sources less dependent 
upon large corporations, states, or other major centers of economic control; and 
ensuring the education and communication capacity of individuals and groups 
within and across nation-state lines. Improving this “infrastructure” for 
 
36. One could think about changing working conditions, the perceived appropriateness of child 
labor, or the acceptance of extreme inequality, among others. I leave aside for now the question 
and possibility of “false consciousness,” though my own view is that it can exist, for example, 
along gender, class, or other lines. 
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economic self-determination would help individuals answer the above questions 
and thus identify the key sources of subordination and connect with potential 
allies to establish the most effective and appropriate “self” for a particular con-
text. Providing this infrastructure could also, of course, be done in conjunction 
with taking steps to ensure the widespread provision of basic material welfare—
thus moving forward both forms of economic well-being in tandem. 
Although at least some of this infrastructure will inevitably work through 
traditional nation-state channels, the idea of multiple selves may also eventually 
help to undermine the tight grip that the nation-state has on our collective po-
litical imagination. Anger at corrupt state elites and calls for greater popular con-
trol over economic outcomes have accompanied the recent backlash against 
globalization mentioned in the opening of this Essay. A number of recent major 
protests against government officials have been launched by relatively minor 
triggers—a hike in transit fare in Chile, a tax on the popular WhatsApp messag-
ing platform in Lebanon—with the protests continuing and escalating even 
when the initial triggers have been removed.37 The underlying anger seems to 
result, at least in part, from larger structural resentments and a sense of power-
lessness in the face of need. But to the extent that this resentment and desire for 
control are channeled exclusively into the nation-state, the result can be author-
itarianism cloaked in the banner of economic populism. Although these move-
ments have generally risen up against national elites, often triggered by a mo-
ment of economic anger, they can therefore paradoxically risk reinscribing an 
alternative form of elite power. Embracing, constructing, and providing outlets 
and mechanisms for the emergence of a more plural and flexible economic “self” 
thus could decouple the desire for economic self-determination from these more 
problematic manifestations of the nation-state. 
If this seems like a highly political project—one unlikely to be welcomed by 
certain powerful political and economic actors—it is. Economic self-determina-
tion (like self-determination more generally, however it is conceived) is hardly 
apolitical or neutral; it rests on the idea that domination and oppression are 
problematic—an idea that has not been uniformly accepted across human his-
tory. Thus, those interested in minimizing the lived experiences of economic 
subordination today may well face resistance in accomplishing a difficult task. 
Economic domination exists through multiple sources and processes and thus 
 
37. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola & Rachelle Krygier, How to Make Sense of the Many Protests Raging 
Across South America, WASH. POST (Nov. 14, 2019, 9:57 AM), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/world/the_americas/a-government-chased-from-its-capital-a-president-forced-into 
-exile-a-storm-of-protest-rages-in-south-america/2019/11/14/897f85ba-0651-11ea-9118 
-25d6bd37dfb1_story.html [https://perma.cc/MUL6-U8RH]; Lebanon Protests: How 
WhatsApp Tax Anger Revealed a Much Deeper Crisis, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www 
.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-50293636 [https://perma.cc/M8CR-Y4GA]. 
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may implicate multiple potential economic selves—individual, local, national, 
and transnational. And the emergence (or strategic selection) of the relevant self 
can be highly historically contingent. At times, a project of economic self-deter-
mination might involve supporting the power of nation-states working individ-
ually or together, while at others it may involve building anti-state coalitions and 
networks across a transnational collectivity. As such, those seeking to shape 
global law and policy need to recognize both the potential and the pitfalls of var-
ious approaches, avoiding, for example, both an atomistic and counterproduc-
tive individualism and an uninterrogated support for elites shielded by the con-
cept of the nation-state. At a deeper process level, they should also help build 
capacities and mechanisms that make the sources of economic unfreedom more 
visible and understandable and that enable the kinds of flexible economic self-
definition and cross-cutting alliances that the contemporary moment requires. 
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